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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of providing blockchain applications with
economically viable randomness (EVR), namely, randomness that
has significant economic consequences. Applications of EVR in-
clude blockchain-based lotteries and gambling. An EVR source
guarantees (i) secrecy, assuring that the random bits are kept se-
cret until some predefined condition indicates that they are safe
to reveal (e.g., the lottery’s ticket sale closes), and (ii) robustness,
guaranteeing that the random bits are published once the condi-
tion holds. We formalize the EVR problem and solve it on top of
an Ethereum-like blockchain abstraction, which supports smart
contracts and a transferable native coin. Randomness is generated
via a distributed open commit-reveal scheme by game-theoretic
agents who strive to maximize their coin holdings. Note that in an
economic setting, such agents might profit from breaking secrecy
or robustness, and may engage in side agreements (via smart con-
tracts) to this end. Our solution creates an incentive structure that
counters such attacks. We prove that following the protocol gives
rise to a stable state, called Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, from
which no coalition comprised of a subset of the players can agree
to deviate. In this stable state, robustness and secrecy are satisfied.
Finally, we implement our EVR source over Ethereum.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Goal
In today’s digital gambling industry, bit strings presumed to be
pseudo-random are generated behind closed doors by centralized
services such as online casinos and lotteries. These random bits have
significant economic implications in allocating valuable prizes to
winners. Yet, these services are not subject to public audit and their
integrity thus must be blindly trusted by their users (the gamblers).
Decentralized smart contract platforms like Ethereum [18, 69]
are creating a paradigm shift in the way digital services are built.
They facilitate decentralized applications, dApps for short, which
are deployed as smart contracts [64] and are guaranteed to follow
well-specified code. Due to their significant economic implications
and susceptibility to manipulation, gambling games could be a
perfect match for this new paradigm. Indeed, ever since it was
launched, Ethereum has experienced a proliferation of gaming
and gambling dApps that require randomness [27]. However, the
randomness generation processes that these dApps adopt today lack
clear guarantees and there is no way to evaluate their resilience to
selfish economic agents who strive to maximize their coin holdings.
This paper addresses the need for trustworthy randomness. We
provide for the first time a randomness source for economic game-
theoretic settings, which dApps can trigger on-demand. We say
that such a source provides Economically Viable Randomness (EVR).
Yet, realizing an EVR source involves a number of intrinsic chal-
lenges. First, if the random bits have high stakes (e.g., in allocating
a large jackpot) there is a strong economic pressure to tamper
with them. It is challenging to counter this pressure without re-
quiring a high collateral. Second, perhaps paradoxically, the same
decentralized and open nature that blockchain platforms offer also
renders them inherently deterministic and therefore incapable of
generating random numbers. Any attempt to enhance dApps with
randomness therefore has to incorporate an off-chain component
and use the blockchain to verify the authenticity of the random
value it provides. To be trustworthy, such an off-chain component
must be decentralized and combine randomness from many inde-
pendent sources. This creates the challenge of scalability, which is
exacerbated in blockchain-based solutions due to their fairly low
capacity and high costs. In order to achieve scalability, one needs
to steer most of the heavy lifting off-chain.
In what follows, we describe our approach to providing EVR.
1.2 Contributions
Blockchain abstraction. In order to conceptualize our solution
independently of any particular blockchain technology, we define
in Section 2 an abstraction, denoted B, capturing the pertinent
aspects of a blockchain offering smart contracts and a native coin.
The coin sets the ground for a game-theoretic model, where agents
strive to maximize their coin holdings in B. Smart contracts allow
us to implement trusted services. We shall use them to realize an
escrow service that handles our game-theoretic agents’ coins in
a way that incentivizes them to behave in accordance with the
system’s desired outcome. On the other hand, smart contracts can
be used by our agents to facilitate trustless agreements among them
in attempts to break our scheme. The blockchain abstraction also
concretizes the notion of publishing information – anything written
on B is irrevocably publicly available.
An EVR source. In Section 3 we formalize the problem that we
set to solve in this work. We begin by defining an ideal random-
ness source that captures the essence of generating trustworthy
randomness via a commit-reveal scheme. The application for which
the randomness is provided specifies a condition (e.g., a time in the
future) indicating when it would like the randomness to be revealed.
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Then, an ideal source satisfies (i) secrecy – the random value does
not leak before the condition holds; and (ii) robustness – when the
condition is met, the random value is indeed revealed.
An ideal source can be used in a simple lottery dApp as follows:
Gamblers buy lottery tickets by sending coins to the lottery’s con-
tract and indicating a 256-bit string. During the ticket sale, the
randomness must remain completely obscure so that no one can
gain an unfair advantage in buying a winning ticket. The condition
to reveal the randomness materializes slightly after the ticket sale
closes. Then, the lottery’s account obtains a random 256-bit string
with which it can infer the winning tickets.
While an ideal source satisfies secrecy and robustness under all
circumstances, an EVR source emulates an ideal one as long as the
application abides with explicit economic bounds on the value of
the randomness, defined by the source. For example, the application
must maintain its total payout (to gamblers) under some bound
specified by the EVR source. In the lottery example, this can be
achieved by limiting the total amount raised from ticket sales.
Our solution. In Section 4 we describe our realization of an EVR
source. Our EVR source is distributed, with open participation: any
blockchain account owner who wishes to partake in producing the
randomness needs to register within a designated escrow service,
realized as a smart contract on B, while depositing a small collat-
eral of 1 coin. The registered accounts’ owners are the players that
realize the EVR source. We use an escrow-mediated distributed
key generation (DKG) protocol [61, 70] in order to achieve robust-
ness for high-stake lotteries despite using small deposits, while
doing most of the computations off-chain with lightweight on-
chain verification. Our solution guarantees secrecy through a novel
informing mechanism that allows anyone who knows the random
value during the period when it should remain obscure to report it
on the escrow contract for a substantial compensation, funded by
the players’ deposits.
Game-theoretic analysis. In Section 5 we analyze our solution in
a game-theoretic setting. Our main result is compelling – we show
that players are incentivized to follow the default strategy (namely,
follow the protocol honestly) ensuring both secrecy and robustness.
Particularly, in the default strategy, players who can inform do
so, and our analysis shows that under well-specified conditions,
informing is profitable and thus effective in deterring collusion in
attempt to break secrecy.
More formally, we show that following the default strategy gives
rise to a Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) [12], a strong equi-
librium concept in game-theory that withstands any self-enforcing
deviation by a coalition (subset of players) of any size. Put differ-
ently, if a strategy is a CPNE, there is no coalition that can deviate
from it to the benefit of all of its members while no sub-coalition
can further deviate and gain more, making the original deviation
unstable in the first place. Importantly, our result holds even if
players may engage in side agreements that are enforced via smart
contracts.
Practical considerations. While most of the paper discusses single-
shot EVR, where a single random value is generated and published,
in Section 6 we describe the multi-shot version, where a single com-
mitment produces multiple random values revealed in succession
as the circumstances ripen to reveal them. This generalization is
needed by real-life applications such as card and die games. Then, in
Section 7 we present a proof-of-concept multi-shot EVR implemen-
tation, where the escrow service is realized as a smart contract on
Ethereum. We address real-world issues that arise due to Ethereum-
specific limitations. Our solution scales to hundreds of participating
accounts, within Ethereum’s block gas limit.
In Section 8 we compare our approach to distributed randomness
solutions in the literature. Our work is unique in its underlying
economic model that assumes that all players are selfish. For this
model, we manage to design a general service that requires constant
deposits (for a jackpot that scales linearly with the number of
players) and that can scale in the number of players that contribute
to the randomness generation process. Finally, Section 9 concludes
the paper.
2 MODEL
In this work we design a service based on today’s blockchain tech-
nologies that embody smart contracts (e.g., Ethereum). In order to
formalize our service in a general way, we define in Section 2.1 an
abstraction, B, capturing the pertinent features of the underlying
blockchain. Our abstraction is based on Ethereum, but intentionally
abstracts away Ethereum-specific technicalities like mining and
generation of coins (ether), transaction fees and gas, the mempool,
the P2P network, etc. We revisit these in Section 7, where we dis-
cuss our implementation over Ethereum. In Section 2.2, we define
the notion of a service in B.
2.1 Smart Contract Platform
B is a smart contract platform abstraction that is accessed by a
collection of users. It consists of four components:
(1) A global clock.
(2) Accts – a key-value map from account identifiers to account
tuples of the form (S,C, s0), where: (1) S is a (potentially
infinite) set of states represented as a collection of state
variables, one of which is the account’s balance b ∈ N0.
(2) C is the code defining the account’s logic. The code is
organized in deterministic functions that manipulate the
account’s state (i.e., define state transitions). Functions are
triggered either by transactions that users generate, or by
other functions that had been previously triggered (cross-
account function triggering is possible). Functions can access
the global clock. (3) s0 ∈ S is the account’s initial state, which
includes b0, the initial balance.
(3) Log – an append-only list of user-issued transactions. Every
transaction begins by invoking a function on some account
and that function may invoke nested calls to other accounts’
functions.
(4) State Machine – a deterministic machine that processes any
sequence of transactions according to the appropriate ac-
count codes.
In B’s initial state, all accounts in Accts are in their initial states.
At any point in time, B’s current state is composed of the states
of all accounts after the State Machine processes the sequence of
transactions that are in B’s Log at that time, starting from B’s
initial state. The State Machine maintains a conservation law of
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Accts’ balances – the sum of balances in all accounts is invariant.
This way, balances represent coins.
Users write to B by issuing transactions and appending them to
the Log. They can also read B’s current state. Writing and reading
happen instantaneously. (We implicitly assume that transactions ex-
ecute a bounded number of steps. Ethereum ensures this in practice
by defining a block gas limit.)
Computations that are invoked by transactions and are pro-
cessed by B’s State Machine are said to occur on-chain. Conversely,
users can execute calculations off-chain, i.e., on private probabilistic
computationally-bounded machines.
A verifiable condition in B is a predicate evaluated against B’s
current state. A verifiable condition that evaluates to true and
remains true in all possible future states of B is said to have ma-
tured. Such conditions may be time-dependant or depend on specific
transactions having been appended to B’s Log.
We distinguish between two types of accounts in B. Using
Ethereum terminology, an externally-owned account (EOA) is an
account whose state consists only of a balance. An EOA’s identifier
is a public key, pk , such that in order to spend the account’s coins,
the account’s code validates a specific signature against pk . Thus,
an EOA is “owned” by the user who has access to the secret key
that corresponds to its identifier.
A smart contract is an account that no user owns. Thus, a smart
contract’s code indicates the terms that allow spending its coins.
In their initial states, smart contracts have zero balance, and subse-
quently they can receive coins from other accounts so each coin in
a smart contract can be traced to its EOA of origin.
A specific type of smart contract that we are interested in is
the escrow account. Such an account holds coins on behalf of other
accounts (EOAs and smart contracts), and permits them towithdraw
these coins according to some predetermined conditions, encoded
in the escrow’s code. For example, a chess-betting escrow account
takes deposits from two EOAs (say 1 coin each), oversees a game
of chess between them, where each EOA, in turn, makes a move
by submitting a transaction (the rules of chess are encoded in the
escrow’s code), and finally when one of the EOAs wins, it pays the
winner the 2 coins it holds.
For simplicity, B abstracts away the process of generating new
EOAs and deploying new smart contracts. Thus, we assume that
all pertinent EOAs and smart contracts exist in B’s initial state.
Every transaction is associatedwith an issuing EOA (that belongs
to user who issued the transaction). (In Ethereum, this is the EOA
that pays the transaction’s gas.) In case multiple transactions are
appended to B’s Log at the same time, they are ordered by the
EOA identifiers that issue them. (This simplification deliberately
abstracts away miners’ freedom to order transactions as they please,
and masks issues like front-running and chain reorgs, which we
revisit in Section 7.)
2.2 A Service as a Smart Contract
A service is an escrow account in B that performs some task for
a third-party, represented by another smart contract on B. For
example, in this work, we build a service that provides randomness
to some gambling dApp. A service begins in a registration phase,
during which users who wish to partake in the service register by
depositing 1 coin into the service’s account. A verifiable condition
dictates when registration closes.
In the context of this work we consider services with permission-
less registration – any user who wishes to do so can register. More-
over, a single user may register multiple times (i.e., deposit mul-
tiple coins in the service’s account). When a coin is deposited by
a smart contract, we attribute it to the owner of the EOA from
which it originated. We refer to the users who deposit coins into
a service as players. By the end of the registration phase, the set
of players is determined and fixed. Denote the registered players
as [N ] = {1, . . . ,N } and the number of coins that player i ∈ [N ]
deposited as ai ∈ N. Denote n ≜ ∑Ni=1 ai , then the service’s balance
at the end of registration is n coins.
We consider a game-theoretic setting, where players followwhat-
ever strategy maximizes their final coin balances inB. We implicitly
assume that the service (or the entity that utilizes the service) offers
players some potential profit, so as to incentivize them to register.
Indeed, paying dividends to service providers is common in Proof-
of-Stake protocols (e.g., Cosmos [44], Tezos [38], Orbs [3]) among
others (e.g., Augur [53], Truebit [65], Livepeer [54]). For the sake
of this work, we simply assume that enough players register.
We further assume that a player i has ei ≥ 0 external coins,
namely, coins that i owns independently of the ones she deposited
in the service’s account. Additionally, players have access to private
communication channels among themselves.
Since players do not trust each other, the only agreements they
can engage in are self-enforcing ones, which are, loosely speaking,
agreements in which all sides are better off following the agree-
ment. The external coins facilitate such trustless agreements. As
an illustration, assume player i earns 5 coins more by taking action
A than by taking action B. She can deposit 8 external coins in a
smart contract that would give her her coins back only if she took
action B. In this way, she distorts her original payoff function, and
the other players would now trust her to take action B. We refer to
such smart contracts as side contracts. Note that players may also
register to a service with side contracts (namely they first transfer
coins from EOAs they own to a side contract and then have the
contract register by further depositing the coins into the service’s
account).
A service is considered sufficiently decentralized if no single reg-
istered player is too “rich” therein. The decentralization assumption
captures this notion quantitatively:
∀i ∈ [N ], ei + ai ≤ n/3. (1)
We note that the decentralization assumption is analogous (to some
extent) to the requirement that no single miner obtains too much
of the hash power in Nakamoto consensus [50].
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION: EVR
Consider an application whose users are economically affected by
the outcome of a random process, for example, a lottery. Given its
economic implications, the random process is a likely target for
manipulation. Our goal in this section is to identify and formalize
the properties that render a randomness source safe to use in such
circumstances.
As a starting point, we assume that the application is imple-
mented as a smart contract in B. Thus, its deterministic logic is
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guaranteed to execute as specified. By the same token, as B’s State
Machine is deterministic, randomness generation cannot happen
purely on-chain. Whenever the application needs a random value, it
triggers the randomness source, which must have an off-chain com-
ponent where the sampling actually happens. Then, the random
value is published on B for the application to use.
In many games of chance there is a stage where gamblers make
choices not knowing what the random value is going to be, and then
the random value is revealed and certain gamblers make a profit
while others lose. To adjust this to B’s terms, we let the application
set a verifiable condition in B, cnd, that matures at some point.
For the application to work as intended, the randomness must
remain completely obscure until cnd matures, and then it needs to
be revealed in the clear.
In Section 3.1 we define an ideal on-chain randomness source
that can be used by applications in this manner. While an ideal
source might be hard to realize, we define in Section 3.2 an econom-
ically viable randomness source, which defines restrictions on the
economic value of the randomness. An application that adheres to
these restrictions can use an EVR source instead of an ideal one.
3.1 Ideal Source
A single-shot randomness source consists of a pair of protocols,
commit and reveal, and a smart contract I in B, as follows:
• A (successful) run of commit produces a commitment, X ,
to a random sample x and publishes X on I. Note that a
commit run must have an off-chain component.
• Following a commit run, a (successful) run of reveal pro-
duces the value committed to, x , and publishes it on I. The
commit and reveal protocols are tied together through a
well-known Boolean verification function ver(x ,X ). For ev-
ery X and for every x1 , x2 either ver(x1,X ) = false or
ver(x2,X ) = false.
• I exposes the following API:
– A function comTrigger(cnd) called by the application
that triggers a commit run, where cnd is a verifiable con-
dition in B, determined by the application, that eventually
matures. Once cnd matures, a reveal run begins.
– Two variables, verCom and verRev, that indicate whether
the commit and reveal runs (resp.) have succeeded. The
variables are initiated to ⊥ and later turn true or false.
verRev is updated via a straightforward check with the
ver function, whereas verCom is protocol-specific.
– Two timeout constants, tcom and trev, that dictate the max-
imum time that the commit and reveal runs (resp.) can
take. In case one of the runs does not complete in a timely
manner, I sets the appropriate variable to false.
The Boolean function ver together with X binds the source to a
specific random value. So, onceX is published on I, x is determined
and no other value would be accepted by I as the random string.
Given the structure of a randomness source, there are two op-
portunities for users to “game” the application. First, obtaining
information about the secret before cnd matures might give a user
an advantage relative to what the application had intended. We
refer to profits made in this manner as stealing. Second, in case
the secret is not published in a timely manner, the application will
normally have some fallback distribution determining how its coins
are distributed, e.g., a refund to the gamblers. This opens up an
opportunity for users to profit from preventing the secret from
being published, by causing either verCom or verRev to be set to
false.
An ideal single-shot randomness source eliminates both of these
risks, and is thus safe to use by an application. Formally, it satisfies
the following core properties:
Non-triviality If I.comTrigger(cnd) is called, then I.verCom
turns true.
Hiding secrecy If I.verCom turns true, then as long as cnd does
not mature, no user obtains any information about x .
Robustness If I.verCom turns true, then after cnd matures
I.verRev also turns true.
Hiding secrecy implies that X is a hiding cryptographic commit-
ment. This means that no one can infer any of x ’s bits with prob-
ability greater than 1/2, implying that x is indeed a random bit
string.
Remark. Generally, a randomness source produces a sequence of
random values, one after the other. This is useful for applications that
proceed in multiple rounds and need a fresh random value for every
round (e.g., card and die games). To keep the presentation concise,
during most of this work, we discuss a single-shot version of the EVR
source. Later, in Section 6, we extend it to multi-shot EVR, in which a
single commitment corresponds to a sequence of random values.
An ideal source is safe to use because it enables the application
to run as intended. However, it is hard to realize in an economic
environment where users may gain from gaming the system.
3.2 EVR Source
We are now ready to define a single-shot EVR source that can be used
in lieu of an ideal one in an economic environment. An EVR source
is a randomness source, but it satisfies the core properties only
provided that the application satisfies the economic restrictions
laid out in Definition 3.1 below. Additionally, an EVR source might
satisfy secrecy rather than hiding secrecy:
Secrecy If I.verCom turns true, then as long as cnd does not
mature, no user obtains x .
Secrecy implies that it is computationally infeasible to learn x from
X (and from participating in the commit run), but it is weaker than
hiding secrecy in the sense that sophisticated users might infer
some information about x . An EVR source that satisfies hiding
secrecy is called a hiding EVR source.
To specify the economic restrictions that an EVR source estab-
lishes for the application, we quantify the profits that can be gained
by causing the EVR source to deviate from the ideal functionality.
Formally, illicit profit is the quantity a user gains when an EVR
source is used on top of the legitimate profit that the user would
have gained if an ideal source were used instead. The EVR smart
contract, I, evaluates the bound on the illicit profit that the EVR
source can sustain and publishes it in a variable we denote by P . As
long as the application respects this bound and the following eco-
nomic restrictions, an EVR source provides ideal-like randomness.
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Definition 3.1 (Single-shot EVR correct usage). An application
correctly uses a (hiding) EVR source if it satisfies the following
conditions:
CU1. If non-triviality breaks, no user gains illicit profit.
CU2. Fallback profit bound. If robustness breaks, the total illicit
profit gained by all users is less than P coins.
CU3. Stealing bound. If (hiding) secrecy breaks, the total illicit
profit gained by all users is less than P coins.
CU4. If (hiding) secrecy and robustness are preserved, no user
gains illicit profit.
These restrictions are reflected in the utility functions of the
game we define in Section 5.2 below.
We next exemplify the interplay between the application and
the EVR source to illustrate that the correct usage restrictions are
feasible. When an application, for instance a lottery, wishes to use
an EVR source, it establishes an adequate condition cnd (e.g., a time
after ticket sales close) and calls I.comTrigger(cnd). Once the pair
(P ,X ) is published on I, the application has the randomness com-
mitted to and can run its logic, e.g., sell lottery tickets to gamblers.
Then, when cnd matures, the application needs x (that corresponds
to X ) in order to complete its logic (in our example, determine the
winning lottery tickets) and make payouts to winners.
If X is published and then x is not published in a timely manner,
then the application uses its fallback rule to determine who gets its
coins. In contrast, if X is not published, then CU1 dictates that no
illicit profit can be made. This implies that the application cannot
make any payouts (and particularly no refunds) in this case. Note
that in order to be trusted by users, a dApp will want to refund gam-
blers in case of failure. Thus, to comply with CU1, the application
should start collecting coins from gamblers only after a successful
commit run.
A straightforward way for an application to comply with CU2
and CU3 is by limiting its total payouts to P coins. That is, P bounds
the jackpot that can be played for, which is typically the amount of
coins collected from ticket sales.
Note that when an EVR source satisfies secrecy rather than
hiding secrecy, to comply with CU4 the application must make
sure that a gambler with partial information about x (before cnd
matures) does not gain an advantage relative to gamblers without
such information. To ensure this, x must be used by the application
carefully. In our example, if say half of x ’s bits can be learned by
a sophisticated player and the lottery’s decision rule is based on
XOR(x , ticket), then that player has a significant advantage over
other players. However, if the decision rule uses hash(x | |ticket)
with a cryptographic hash function, then having partial information
about x does not help.
Finally, the application might have to worry about other pitfalls
that depend on the specific EVR realization used. For instance, if x
is shared among a set of players who can combine data they each
privately hold to reconstruct the secret, the application might be
vulnerable to collusion via a multi-party computation (MPC) [6, 8,
19, 20, 23, 37, 58, 71, 72]. That is, players might cooperate through
an MPC protocol that ensures the privacy of their inputs, computes
x , and uses it to infer a winning ticket, which is the only part of
the computation that is outputted (all steps of the computation
are kept obscure). In this way, none of the players actually learns
x , but they still manage to steal application coins. To circumvent
this issue, the application must choose a decision rule that is “MPC
resistant”, namely that is slow to compute via MPC. As of today,
MPCs are not practical; for instance, a state-of-the-art SHA-256
7-party computation takes about 20 seconds (over a fast LAN) [24],
which is 7 orders of magnitude slower than performing the same
computation insecurely [2, 67].
4 AN EVR SOURCE AS A SERVICE IN B
We now realize an EVR source. In Section 4.1 we overview Escrow-
DKG, which is a building block in our solution. Then, in Section 4.2
we present our protocol. In Section 4.3 we explain the rationale
behind our protocol’s design and parameter choices.
4.1 Background – Escrow-DKG
Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocols [34, 35, 52] for discrete-
log based threshold schemes allow a set of n servers to jointly gen-
erate a pair of public and secret keys, (x ,X = дx ), in such a way
that X is output in the clear while x is shared by the n servers via
Shamir secret sharing [62]. Unless an adversary compromises more
than a specified threshold t out of the n servers, x remains secret
and its shares can be subsequently used by the servers to jointly
compute x . The secret shares can alternatively be used jointly to
perform other cryptographic tasks, e.g., decryption and signatures;
(this will become useful for the multi-shot EVR in Section 6). We
refer to the key generation protocol as DKGCommit and to the sub-
sequent protocol that combines shares in order to reconstruct x as
DKGReveal.
Escrow-DKG [70] is a DKG protocol variant in the Joint-Feldman
family [34, 35, 52]. It differs from the traditional protocols in its
underlying model. Whereas traditional DKG protocols assume an
adversary that corrupts up to t servers, Escrow-DKG assumes an
economic model where all players are rational. Additionally, as its
name hints, it assumes a trusted escrow service that substitutes and
enhances the broadcast channel usually assumed in these protocols.
While runs of traditional DKG protocols always succeed, Escrow-
DKG might fail.
An Escrow-DKG run begins with a permission-less registration
phase (as defined for a service in Section 2.2), where players deposit
1 coin per secret share they stand to obtain. After registration,
the set of players is fixed. The players then engage in a run of
DKGCommit. The run fails if the escrow detects that one (or more)
of the players has deviated from the protocol. In such an event, the
escrow declares the failure, returns deposits tied to honest shares,
and confiscates deposits tied to misbehaving shares. When there is
nothing to gain from failing a DKGCommit run, it is every player’s
dominant strategy to comply with the protocol and so the run ends
successfully, with every player obtaining a valid share per coin they
deposited. These shares correspond to x , and X = дx is published
as part of the run.
During a subsequent run of DKGReveal, players broadcast their
shares to each other. Any player that collects t + 1 shares can then
reconstruct x and publish it to the escrow. The escrow verifies that
the published value is indeed the secret key that corresponds to X
using the Boolean function ver(x ,X ), which verifies that X = дx .
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Eth-DKG [4] implements such an escrow as a smart contract on
Ethereum.
4.2 Our EVR Source Realization
Our EVR source uses DKGcommit and DKGreveal. The smart con-
tract that we implement, denoted G, is an extension of the escrow
functionality in Escrow-DKG. Like Escrow-DKG, G is a service in
B (see Section 2.2). In Algorithm 1 we give the pseudo-code for G.
It proceeds through the following phases, as depicted in Figure 1:
Algorithm 1 The service G
Constants: tcom, trev , д
Globals: X , x ,P ,ℓ ,t ,cnd ,commitStart
Init: accounts ← empty list; n ← 0; verCom ,verRev ←⊥;
phase ← ‘registration’
function ver(x, X )
1: return X = дx
function register(acc, $1)
2: if phase , ‘registration’ then exit
3: accounts.append(acc)
4: n ← n + 1; G.balance = G.balance + $1
function comTrigger(cndApp) ▷ invoked only by the application
5: if phase , ‘registration’ then exit
6: phase ← ‘commit’
7: commitStart ← now
8: t ← 2n3 ; ℓ ← n; P ← n − t
9: cnd ← cndApp
function interactCommit(data)
10: if phase , ‘commit’ then exit
11: if now − commitStart < tcom
12: save data in localState
13: if now − commitStart ≥ tcom
14: verCom← noMisbehavior(localState)
15: if verCom
16: compute X from localState
17: phase ← ‘pending’
18: else
19: phase ← ‘abort’
function inform(xInform, acc)
20: if phase = ‘commit’ then interactCommit()
21: if phase , ‘pending’ then exit
22: verRev ← ver(xInform, X )
23: if (not cnd) and verRev
24: x ← xInform
25: pay acc $ℓ; G.balance = G.balance − $ℓ
26: phase ← ‘abort’
function reveal(xReveal)
27: if phase = ‘commit’ then interactCommit()
28: if phase , ‘pending’ then exit
29: if cnd and now −matureTime(cnd) < trev ▷ reveal phase (implicit)
30: verRev ← ver(xReveal, X )
31: if verRev
32: x ← xReveal
33: pay each acc ∈ accounts $1; G.balance = G.balance − $n
34: phase ← ‘final’
35: if now −matureTime(cnd) ≥ trev
36: phase ← ‘abort’
The registration phase. During registration, users submit registra-
tion transactions that invoke the G.register(acc, $1) function of
Escrow-DKG (we use the $ sign to denote coins).
The commit phase. G enters the commit phase when the application
calls G.comTrigger(cndApp). This function sets the parameters
for DKGcommit: n is the number of accounts that have registered,
and accordingly, the total number of shares to be generated by
a successful run (and the total number of coins deposited in G
during the registration phase); t = 2n3 is the threshold parameter.
Recall that we assume that N players register, such that player
i deposits ai coins (so
∑N
i=1 ai = n), and thus, ends up with ai
private shares (in a successful run). G.comTrigger(cndApp) sets
three additional parameters (that are not related to DKGcommit;
lines 8 and 9): P = n − t = n/3 is the bound on the illicit profit
that the EVR can sustain; ℓ = n is the informing reward, explained
below; and cnd = cndApp is the application’s condition to trigger
the reveal run.
DKGcommit can now run among the N players (and their n ac-
counts). Players invoke the interactCommit function to write
information to G’s state during the DKGcommit run. This infor-
mation is vital for G to detect misbehavior (e.g., an account that
does not supply the data it is expected to). The DKGcommit run has
tcom seconds to complete, by the end of which G verifies that no
misbehavior was detected by any of the registered accounts (as
described in the Escrow-DKG paper [70]); line 14. If G does not
detect any misbehavior, G.verCom is updated to true. Otherwise,
G.verCom is updated to false and G aborts.
In a successful run, any t + 1 shares (or more) can reconstruct
x , while any t shares (or less) reveal nothing about x . The run also
computes X = дx and publishes it on G.
By CU1, nothing can be gained from failing DKGcommit, and
thus, when all players are rational, DKGcommit does not fail. Hence,
our solution is non-trivial. In case it does fail, G returns all deposits
that are tied to honest shares, as noted in Section 4.1 above (this
part is not shown in the pseudo-code).
The pending phase. When the commit phase completes successfully,
G enters the pending phase. This phase is the crux of the protocol,
when only the informing function G.inform(x , acc) can be called.
Informing is key to ensuring secrecy, namely that x remains secret
so long as cnd does not mature.
The incentive to break secrecy is evident – a group of players
who collude, secretly pass their shares among themselves, and
manage to reconstruct x before cnd matures maymake a substantial
illicit profit by stealing up to P coins (by CU3) from the application
(for instance, by knowingly buying a winning lottery ticket). The
informing mechanism nullifies this incentive by allowing any user
who knows x before cnd matures to publish it on G’s account for a
high reward of ℓ coins (line 25). The informant who “betrays” the
collusion is rewarded for her actions. The reward comes from the
players’ deposits, which are all confiscated in this case. If informing
occurs, it implies that t + 1 (or more) accounts have reconstructed
x while it was forbidden to do so; informing can thus be seen as a
collective punishment of the players.
If multiple informants attempt to inform, we assume for sim-
plicity that all of their informing transactions are submitted to B
simultaneously. B’s Log then orders the transactions according to
the deterministic order described in Section 2.1 and only the first
transaction takes effect. If informing happens, G advances to the
abort phase; line 26. Otherwise, G enters the reveal phase when
cnd matures; line 29.
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Figure 1: A high-level view of G’s phases.
The reveal phase. During the reveal phase, the players engage in a
run of DKGreveal to reconstruct x . If the run completes success-
fully, then x is published on G. G then verifies that the published
secret is correct (i.e., that it corresponds to X ; line 30). If this is
the case, G updates G.verRev to true. The players then get their
deposits back (line 33), and G advances to the final phase.
In case the players fail to publish x in a timely manner, G enters
the abort phase and all players’ deposits are confiscated (lines 35
and 36). This is another form of collective punishment that G en-
forces. Note that in order for this to happen, players holding at least
n − t shares must refrain from participating in the DKGreveal run.
We note that in the DKGreveal run, players do not publish their
individual shares on G. Rather, they exchange shares among them-
selves off-chain, reconstruct x off-chain, and eventually publish x
on G. The reason to do these steps off-chain is mostly a practical
one. See Section 7 for more details.
The final and abort phases. In the final phase, the application, or
anyone for that matter, can read x from G. If G enters the final
phase, then robustness is satisfied. Conversely, the abort phase
implies that the EVR source has failed. In this phase, any call to any
of G’s functions fails.
4.3 G’s Design Rationale
We now give the intuition behind our parameters’ choices: t = 2n3 ,
P = n − t and ℓ = n.
First note that if P > n − t , then players holding n − t shares
might be better off failing DKGreveal because, by CU2, they can
potentially gain P coins from the application while only losing
n − t coins to G. Since we want P to be as large as possible, we set
P = n − t .
We would also like the informing reward, ℓ, to be as large as
possible, encouraging a player who obtains t + 1 shares or more
before cnd matures to inform. We therefore set ℓ = n, which is the
total amount of coins in possession of G.
By CU4, informing cannot be bypassed: in order to steal the
application’s coins, at least one player needs to locally reconstruct
x . That player then needs to make a decision – to inform or to
steal. As long as there is no player who is better off stealing than
informing, the informing mechanism is effective. It discourages
players from attempting to break secrecy as they realize that any
one of them would inform if they had the possibility to do so.
We note that side contracts cannot force an informant to forfeit
or re-distribute her reward from G. To clarify this subtle point,
consider the following scenario: A player who wishes to steal the
jackpot might attempt to convince fellow players to cooperate with
her (i.e., send her their shares) by committing to give up the inform-
ing rewardwere she to inform. If that was possible, informingwould
lose its sting. This issue is solved by letting informants indicate an
arbitrary account to transfer the reward to. Thus, an informant can
always use a fresh EOA in B that is not related to any side contract.
We are left with setting t . While an informant cannot distribute
her informing reward, she can distribute her external coins. Ad-
ditionally, in case of informing (which implies that robustness is
violated), the application’s coins might end up in players’ hands
by CU2 (according to the application’s fallback distribution). To
make sure that informing results in losses for at least one collud-
ing player, it must be the case that it is not profitable to distribute
ei + P = ei + n − t coins among players holding t + 1 − ai shares.
The decentralization assumption (Equation (1)) takes care of this:
ei + ai ≤ 2t − n for all i ∈ [N ]. We set t as to maximize both the
economic worth of the randomness P = n − t , and the maximal
player balance allowed ei + ai = 2t −n. This leads us to set: t = 2n3 .
Note that since we assume that a single player can register mul-
tiple times in G, assuring secrecy would be hopeless if we did not
assume that for all i ∈ [N ], ai ≤ t = 2n3 . The decentralization
assumption is a bit stronger: ∀i ∈ [N ], ai + ei ≤ n/3 = t/2.
Remark (Collective punishments). Note that in case informing
happens (which implies that secrecy breaks) or if the reveal phase
timeouts (which implies that robustness breaks), all players are slashed
including ones that behaved honestly. However, in case non-triviality
breaks, no collective punishment is enforced.
Collective punishment is inevitable in case secrecy is violated as it
is impossible to detect which players colluded in order to break secrecy.
Regarding robustness, we chose to take the collective punishment
approach due to practical considerations (see Section 7 for details).
5 GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
We now turn to analyze our EVR source. In Section 5.1 we give
necessary concepts in game theory. In Section 5.2 we model our
protocol as a game among G’s players. Finally, Section 5.3 presents
our analysis, showing that our solution satisfies the EVR properties
under a strong game-theoretic solution concept.
5.1 Preliminaries – Game Theory
An N -player (normal-form) game Γ is a pair ⟨∏Ni=1 Si , {ui }Ni=1⟩,
where Si is player i’s strategy set; and ui :
∏N
i=1 Si → Z is i’s payoff
function. We denote S =
∏N
i=1 Si . We consider non-cooperative
games where binding agreements are not possible.
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Given a proper subset J ⊊ [N ] and a strategy vector s =
(s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ S , denote by s J = (si )i ∈J the projection of s on
indexes in J , and let −J = [N ] \ J . In a game Γ, when a subset of
the players −J fixes its strategy vector to some s ′−J ∈
∏
i ∈−J Si ,
it induces a new game among the remaining players J , which
we denote by Γ/s ′−J . Thus, Γ/s ′−J ≜ ⟨
∏
i ∈J Si , {ui }i ∈J ⟩, where
ui (s J ) = ui (s J , s ′−J ) for all i ∈ J and s J ∈
∏
i ∈J Si .
A common solution concept in game theory is a Nash Equilib-
rium, which stipulates that unilateral deviations are not profitable
to individual players. This is a fairly weak solution concept, as a
coalition might still gain from deviating. The concept of Strong
Nash Equilibrium rules out deviations by any conceivable coali-
tion. However, this concept is often considered to be too strong,
as explained in [12]: “coalitions are allowed complete freedom in
choosing their joint deviations: while the whole set of players is
concerned with arriving at a strategy vector that is immune to
deviations by any coalition, no deviating group of players faces a
similar restriction.”
The concept of Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium, due to Bern-
heim et al. [12], solves this inconsistency by considering only self-
enforcing deviations, namely, deviations that are stable in the sense
that no subset of the deviators has motivation to deviate further.
Formally:
Definition 5.1 (Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE)). LetN >
0 and Γ = ⟨S, {ui }Ni=1⟩ be an N -player game.
(1) If N = 1, strategy s∗ ∈ S is a CPNE in Γ if s∗ maximizes u1(·).
(2) If N > 1, assume that CPNE has been defined for games with
fewer than N players. Then:
(a) A strategy s∗ ∈ S is self-enforcing in Γ if for all J ⊊ [N ],
s∗J is a CPNE in Γ/s∗−J .
(b) A strategy s∗ ∈ S is a CPNE in Γ if it is self-enforcing in Γ
and there does not exist another self-enforcing strategy
s ∈ S such that ui (s) > ui (s∗) for all i ∈ [N ].
A CPNE is a powerful solution concept attainable in non-
cooperative games.When considering only self-enforcing strategies,
it ensures Pareto efficiency, namely, there is no other self-enforcing
strategy vector that increases at least one player’s payoff without
decreasing anyone else’s.
In general, proving that some strategy is a CPNE can be difficult.
However, to the purpose of the upcoming analysis the following
observation suffices.
Observation 1. Let Γ = ⟨S, {ui }⟩ and consider a strategy vector
s∗ ∈ S . Assume that for every deviating coalition C ⊂ [N ] and for
every strategy vector s1C ∈
∏
i ∈C Si , there exists a member j ∈ C
such that, either (i) uj (s1C , s∗−C ) ≤ uj (s∗) (namely, j in not better-off
after the deviation), or (ii) there exists s2j ∈ Sj such that u j (s2j , s1−j ) >
u j (s1C ) in Γ/s∗−C (namely, j is better-off unilaterally re-deviating from
s1C , rendering the original deviation not self-enforcing). Then, s
∗ is a
CPNE in Γ.
5.2 The Players’ Game Γ
Our game-theoretic analysis begins after a set of N players have
chosen to register in G. (As noted in Section 2.2, incentivizing
players to register can be done as in other services [3, 38, 44, 53,
54, 65] and is beyond the scope of this work.) Specifically, player
i ∈ [N ] has chosen to deposit ai coins and keep her remaining ei
coins externally. We assume that the distribution of coins adheres
to Equation (1) (decentralization).
We define Γ, the N -player game played by G’s players. We de-
scribe Γ’s strategies in three consecutive stages, where in later
stages players are aware of previous stages’ outcome and make
decisions in accordance (such a game description is sometimes
referred to as extensive-form).
(1) In stage 0 players engage in side contracts – for each coin
that they register with (and obtain a private share for), they
decide whether to register with an EOA or via a side con-
tract; additionally, they decide whether to use their external
coins within side contracts. This stage is played during G’s
registration phase.
(2) In stage 1 each player i selects a subset of [N ] \ {i} and
sends to each member in this set some or all of her shares.
Particularly, i can choose to keep her shares private. This
stage is played during G’s pending phase.
(3) In stage 2 a player obtaining t + 1 shares or more can inform
or attempt to illicitly gain application’s coins by stealing.
Also, after cnd matures, when DKGreveal runs, each player
either complies with the protocol’s rules or deviates. Players
who comply with DKGreveal broadcast (off-chain) all of
their shares, and players who deviate broadcast none of
them. Once a compliant player collects t + 1 shares, she
reconstructs x and publishes it (on G).
Note that each stage is played instantaneously, namely, all play-
ers decide on their actions at the same time. Specifically, in stage
2, this means that a player i who decides not to reveal her shares
cannot decide to reveal them after seeing shares sent by other play-
ers (and potentially reconstructing x privately with her own shares
that she has yet to publish). This formulation has i decide whether
to reveal her shares before she knows x . Indeed, our game models
the players as pessimistic, namely, i makes her decision under the
belief that her legitimate x-dependent profit is zero. And yet, in
practice, the value of x might impact i’s legitimate profit from the
application (e.g., if she is genuinely lucky to hold a winning ticket),
thereby affecting her decision. Nevertheless, if i is optimistic, she is
ever more motivated to comply with DKGreveal in stage 2. Thus,
ruling out such players (i.e., assuming pessimistic ones) does not
weaken our analysis.
The default strategy is to follow the protocol: not to engage in
side contracts in stage 0; not to send any shares in stage 1; and in
stage 2, to inform on obtaining t + 1 shares or more, and otherwise
to broadcast all shares during DKGreveal, and publish x on G
whenever possible.
Γ’s payoffs, {ui }Ni=1, are distributed at the end of the game,
namely after stage 2. The payoff functions reflect the game’s impact
on the players’ balances; thus, player i’s total balance (in all her
accounts) in B at the end of the game is ei + ui (s). The payoffs
depend on the game’s high-level outcome in s ∈ S , as captured by
the following three predicates:
(1) INF(s) indicates whether informing occurs in s .
(2) SEC(s) indicates whether secrecy is maintained in s , namely,
if no player obtains x before cnd matures.
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(3) ROB(s) indicates whether robustness holds in s , i.e., ROB(s) if
G ends in the final phase (rather than abort).
Note that INF(s) implies ¬SEC(s), as informing requires at least
one player to obtain x during stage 1. Also, INF(s) implies ¬ROB(s),
because G enters the abort phase after informing.
There are three pools of coins that players may gain coins from
or lose coins to. We use three auxiliary functions to define how the
coins in these pools are distributed and postulate bounds on their
values given the predicates above:
Application’s coins Recall that we model the players’ beliefs
about legitimate profits from the application as zero (as ex-
plained above). Thus, only illicit profits from the application
are considered. We use z : S → ZN to capture such profits.
The following bounds hold:
A1. For all i ∈ [N ] and for all s ∈ S , zi (s) ≥ 0 and∑Nj=1 zj (s) <
P , by CU2 and CU3.
A2. If SEC(s) ∧ ROB(s), then ∀i ∈ [N ] : zi (s) = 0, by CU4.
External coins y : S → ZN determines how the players’ exter-
nal coins are distributed due to side contracts that burn or
transfer the coins in certain circumstances.
We have the following bounds:
E1. For all i ∈ [N ] and for all s ∈ S , yi (s) ≥ −ei is restricted
by i’s external coins.
E2. Furthermore, for all s ∈ S , ∑Ni=1 yi (s) ≤ 0.
E3. In every strategy vector s ∈ S in which player i ∈ [N ]
does not engage in side contracts in stage 0, yi (s) ≥ 0.
Deposits in G w : S → ZN determines how G’s deposits are
distributed among the players. Players can register through
side contracts that, in certain circumstances, force them to
redistribute their deposits if G pays them back.
Hence, the following bounds hold:
D1. For all i ∈ [N ] and for all s ∈ S , wi (s) ≥ 0, and∑N
j=1w j (s) ≤ n.
D2. If INF(s) then the informant, f , gains ℓ coins and all oth-
ers forfeit their deposits. Namely,wf (s) = ℓ and ∀i , f :
wi (s) = 0. (Recall from Section 4.3 that an informant can-
not bind herself, through side contracts or otherwise, to
forfeit or re-distribute the informing reward.)
D3. If ¬INF(s) ∧ ¬ROB(s), then ∀i ∈ [N ] : wi (s) = 0 (i.e., all
deposits are confiscated).
D4. Also, in a strategy vector s ∈ S in which player i does not
engage in side contracts in stage 0 and ROB(s),wi (s) ≥ ai .
Remark. We note that the functionsw(·) and y(·) do not depend
on x . This implies that Γ does not capture side bets between the players
that depend on the value of x . Indeed, if such side bets were to be made
then the randomness would be worth more than dictated by correct
usage.
Using these functions, we get ui (s) = zi (s) + yi (s) +wi (s). We
note that each player’s payoff is at least −ei and the sum of players’
payoffs is less than n + P , namely,
P1. ∀s ∈ S , ∀i ∈ [N ] : ui (s) ≥ −ei and ∑Nj=1 uj (s) < n + P .
For brevity, we omit the strategy vector s when it is clear from
the context.
5.3 Analysis
Broadly speaking, our goal in this section is to show that in an
economic game-theoretic setting, and under our assumptions re-
garding the players and correct usage, our solution for the EVR
source yields strategy choices that satisfy the non-triviality, secrecy,
and robustness properties. Non-triviality is immediate from CU1
and Escrow-DKG’s properties, as explained in Section 4.2 (note
that Γ is played only if non-triviality is met). To show secrecy and
robustness, we analyze Γ. We prove that the default strategy vector,
which indeed satisfies both properties, is a CPNE in Γ.
Let s∗ be the default strategy vector.
Claim 1. For all i ∈ [N ], ui (s∗) = ai .
Proof. The decentralization assumption implies SEC(s∗) – no
player obtains at least t + 1 shares in stage 1, therefore informing
does not occur and no illicit profit is made by knowing x in advance.
Additionally, in s∗ all players provide their shares in stage 2, which
implies ROB(s∗), and so no illicit profit is made from the application’s
fallback distribution. Finally, since no side contracts are used in s∗,
no player loses any of her external coins or deposits. Hence, by A2,
E2, E3, D1 and D4 the payoffs are: ui (s∗) = ai , for all i ∈ [N ]. □
For the analysis’s sake, we partition the strategy space S into
S+ = {s ∈ S : ∀i ∈ [N ],ui (s) ≥ 0} and S− = {s ∈ S : ∃i ∈
[N ],ui (s) < 0}. Note that S+ ∪ S− = S and S+ ∩ S− = ∅. We use the
following notation in the proofs: given a set of players C ⊆ [N ],
∥C ∥ ≜ ∑i ∈C ai .
The following lemma states that s∗ is immune to deviations in
S+ that preserve secrecy, and is proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 5.2. For all C ⊆ [N ] and for all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si , such that
(i) SEC(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, there exists a player i ∈ C
such that ui (s∗) ≥ ui (sC , s∗−C ).
We proceed to analyze the game when secrecy is violated, and il-
licit profit and informing are feasible. The following lemma, proven
in Appendix A, shows that whenever informing happens, at least
one player who deviated from s∗ and facilitated informing is not
better off.
Lemma 5.3. For all C ⊆ [N ] and for all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si , such that
(i) INF(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, there exists a player i ∈ C
such that ui (s∗) ≥ ui (sC , s∗−C ).
The following lemma, proven in Appendix A using Lemma 5.3,
shows that any deviation from s∗ that breaks secrecy is either not
self-enforcing or has (at least) one deviating player who is not better
off.
Lemma 5.4. For all C ⊆ [N ] and all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si , such that
(i) ¬SEC(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, either (sC , s∗−C ) is not self-
enforcing, or there exists a player i ∈ C such thatui (s∗) ≥ ui (sC , s∗−C ).
We note that in Lemma 5.4, when (sC , s∗−C ) is not self-enforcing,
it is due to the possibility of one of C’s members to unilaterally
re-deviate profitably. Finally, we prove our main result.
Theorem 5.5. s∗ is a CPNE in Γ.
Proof. Consider a coalition C that deviates from s∗ resulting in
a strategy vector s = (sC , s∗−C ).
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If s ∈ S−, then let j ∈ [N ] be a player for whom uj (s) < 0. Surely,
j ∈ C , as if j does not engage in any side contracts (as in s∗), she
cannot lose any of her external coins and is thus guaranteed a non-
negative payoff. Thus, j is a deviating player who loses from the
deviation.
It remains to consider s ∈ S+. Consider two cases:
(1) SEC(s). From Lemma 5.2, there exists a player i ∈ C such that
ui (s∗) ≥ ui (s), that is, i is a member of C that is not better
off due to the deviation.
(2) ¬SEC(s). From Lemma 5.4 either s is not self-enforcing or
there exists a player j ∈ C who is not better off due to the
deviation.
We have shown that any possible deviation of a coalitionC ⊆ [N ]
from s∗ is either not self-enforcing (due to a unilateral deviation
of one of C’s members) or includes a member that is not better off.
Hence, by Observation 1, s∗ is a CPNE in Γ as required. □
Remark. s∗ is not a Strong Nash Equilibrium in Γ because a coali-
tion with t + 1 shares that deviates, breaks secrecy, and illicitly gains
P coins may benefit all of its members. Nevertheless, as shown, in-
forming renders such deviations not self-enforcing.
6 MULTI-SHOT EVR
Up to this point, for simplicity, we focused on a randomness source
that produces a single random value. In principle, such a source
may be used also by applications that require a sequence of random
values, such as card and die games. To this end, the application
needs to invoke G.comTrigger for each random value it consumes.
However, this approach is undesirable for two reasons. First, it
is likely that the commit protocol is expensive and so we would
like to avoid running it multiple times. In fact, in our EVR source
realization, it is the only phase when disputes might need to be
handled (as part of the DKG).
Second, recall that the EVR incentive structure explicitly lever-
ages the fact that no illicit profit can be made by failing commit
(CU1). This is easy to establish when commit is executed once in a
dApp, before the game begins and before the gamblers send their
coins to the application’s contract. But a dApp that guarantees a
refund to gamblers cannot satisfy CU1 in its second commit run:
by this point, some gamblers might discover, for instance, that they
are likely to lose their gambling coins, creating an incentive for
them to fail the commit run (which would force the application
to refund the gamblers). In our solution, failing a DKGcommit run
costs at most 1 coin, so an about-to-lose gambler can register once
in the second DKGcommit run and fail it. They would lose 1 coin
for failing DKGcommit, but would possibly save a much larger bet
in the application.
To overcome this issue, we define and construct a multi-shot
randomness source, which robustly reveals a sequence of random
values following a single commit. Our construction is based on
verifiable random functions (VRFs). Background on VRFs is given in
Section 6.1, and the multi-shot EVR source’s definition is presented
in Section 6.2. The adaption of Algorithm 1 to the multi-shot case
is straightforward and its implementation is discussed in Section 7
below.
6.1 Preliminaries – Verifiable Random
Functions
A VRF [47] is a local (non-distributed) function providing a pseu-
dorandom value along with a cryptographic proof that the value
was indeed randomly generated. We give a simplified definition of
a VRF:
Definition 6.1 (VRF). A VRF is a triple of efficient algorithms:
• gen(), returning a pair of keys (PK , SK);
• eval(SK ,m), returning a bit string σ ; and
• a Boolean function ver-VRF(PK ,m,σ ).
Assume gen() returns (PK , SK). Then the following hold:
Complete Provability For all bit stringsm, if eval(SK ,m) = σ ,
then ver-VRF(PK ,m,σ ) = true.
Unique Provability For all bit stringsm,σ1,σ2, such that σ1 , σ2,
either ver-VRF(PK ,m,σ1) = false or ver-VRF(PK ,m,σ2) =
false.1
Residual Pseudorandomness There does not exist an efficient
algorithm that receives PK as input and after selecting some
m (as it pleases) can distinguish (with non-negligible advan-
tage) between σ = eval(SK ,m) ∈ {0, 1}h and a bit string
sampled uniformly at random from {0, 1}h .
VRFs can be implemented by certain signature schemes [47].
We use a specific BLS signature scheme as a VRF in our prototype
implementation (see Section 7).
6.2 Multi-Shot EVR Source
Let (gen, eval, ver-VRF) be a VRF. Amulti-shot randomness source
consists of a pair of protocols, commit and reveal, and a smart
contract I in B, as follows:
• A (successful) run of commit computes gen(), producing
(PK , SK), and publishes PK on I (SK remains obscure as
implied from the secrecy property below).
• Following a commit run, the ith (successful) run of reveal
computes σi = eval(SK , i) and publishes it on I.
• I exposes the following API:
– A function comTrigger(cnd[k]) called by the application
that triggers a commit run, where cnd[k] is a list of k
verifiable conditions in B, cnd[k] = (cnd1, . . . , cndk ), de-
termined by the application, that all eventually mature.
Once cndi matures, the ith reveal run begins (given that
i − 1 reveal runs have already completed).
– k + 1 variables, verCom and (verRev1,. . . ,verRevk ), that
indicate whether the commit and subsequent k reveal
runs (resp.) have succeeded. All variables are initiated
to ⊥ and later turn true or false. verRevi is updated
using ver-VRF(PK , i,σi ); verCom is protocol-specific, and
(among other things) verifies that the pair (PK , SK) is a
valid key pair that gen could output.
– k+1 timeout constants, tcom and (t1rev, . . . , tkrev) that dictate
the maximum time that the commit and subsequent k
reveal runs (resp.) can take. In case one of the runs does
1In the original definition, ver-VRF is a probabilistic algorithm and properties (1) and
(2) hold with overwhelming probability in the security parameter.
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not complete in a timely manner, I sets the appropriate
variable to false.
As in the single-shot case, an ideal multi-shot randomness source
is a multi-shot randomness source satisfies the following core prop-
erties:
Non-triviality If I.comTrigger(cnd[k]) is called, then I.verCom
turns true.
Hiding secrecy If I.verCom turns true, then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k as
long as cndi does not mature, no user obtains any informa-
tion about σi .
Robustness If I.verCom turns true, then after cndi matures
I.verRevi also turns true.
A multi-shot EVR source is a multi-shot randomness source,
possibly satisfying secrecy rather than hiding secrecy. It satisfies the
core properties provided that the application satisfies the economic
restrictions of Definition 3.1.
In the ensuing section we spell out the adjustments required in
order to turn our single-shot EVR source (Section 4) into a multi-
shot EVR source.
7 PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We now present our implementation of a multi-shot variant of
G over Ethereum, denoted Gˆ. In Section 7.1 we point to a few
aspects where Ethereum diverges from our idealized blockchain
abstraction B. In Section 7.2 we provide implementation details,
and in Section 7.3, we address issues that arise due to the aspects
discussed in Section 7.1.
7.1 “Mind The Gap”: Ethereum vs B
As described in Section 2, B’s Log can instantaneously append
and process an unbounded number of transactions that consume
unbounded computational resources. If transactions are issued con-
currently, they are appended to the Log according to some deter-
ministic order. Conversely, in Ethereum, transactions are appended
to the blockchain in blocks, which are mined at an average pace of
1 block per 12 − 15 seconds [28], and are bounded in the computa-
tional resources they may consume (and thus also in the number of
transactions they can include). Specifically, blocks are allowed to
consume at most ≈ 107 gas [29] (as of June 2020), a unit of measure-
ment quantifying the computational resources in Ethereum. These
restrictions imply that transaction issuers compete for limited re-
sources. The competition takes place in the form of a gas auction:
transaction issuers bid how much fee they are willing to pay per
unit of gas that their transaction consumes. Among the pending
transactions, miners have complete freedom to pick transactions
to their blocks. Since a transaction’s fee is paid to the miner that
includes it in a block, miners tend to pick the highest fee-paying
transactions.
Ethereum’s open fee market introduces the possibility to front-
run: front-running occurs when a later issued transaction out-bids
an earlier one and ends up being processed first.
Whereas B’s Log is immutable, in Ethereum, miners choose
voluntarily on top of which blockchain tip to mine, creating a pos-
sibility for chain reorgs, where blocks that appear to have been
appended are supplanted by other blocks (if hashrate is sufficiently
decentralized and block propagation is fast enough, miners are in-
centivized to mine on top of the longest branch, which is considered
to be the canonical one, and this risk is reduced).
7.2 Implementation Details
To realize Escrow-DKG in Ethereum, we use the open-source Eth-
DKG library of Asayag et al. [4] (we chose to use this library rather
than a similar one due to Schindler et al. [60] because the former in-
corporates deposits and slashing as needed for our game-theoretic
setting). Loosely speaking, Eth-DKG implements a VRF via a thresh-
old BLS signature scheme. During the commit phase, it generates a
pair of keys – x the secret key for signing and X = дx the public
key for signature verification. While X is published on-chain, x , is
shared by the participants via Shamir secret sharing. The library
can be used to verify that key generation was successful and up-
date verCom as described in Section 4.2. During the pending and
reveal phases, signatures (rather than x itself as in the single-shot
version) are published on-chain. Every signature is evaluated via an
on-chain signature verification function that uses X (and updates
verRevi ). The library utilizes a number of pre-compiled contracts
(that were originally introduced to Ethereum to allow for efficient
on-chain verification of zk-SNARKS [9, 69]) for signature verifica-
tion. A single signature verification consumes 113,000 gas [21].
The reveal phase is scalable: signature reconstruction happens
off-chain and only verification is done on-chain, at a price of verify-
ing a single (threshold) BLS signature, regardless of the number of
shares that were required to compute the signature or the number
of participants in the DKG. The off-chain reconstruction requires
communication among the players. On a public WAN, it takes less
than a second (in normal conditions, with hundreds of participants).
The delay in the reveal phase thus mostly depends on Ethereum’s
block rate. To be on the safe side, we set the timeout in the re-
veal phase to be 10 minutes (this parameter is configurable). Note
that the timeout only affects latency in case of failure, whereas
successful reveals can be fast.
The on-chain component of Eth-DKG’s key generation (i.e., the
commit phase) is less scalable. It essentially verifies n independent
Feldman verifiable secret sharing [32] runs. Implementing this on-
chain naÃŕvely would consume a lot of resources and would be
infeasible even for small ns. Eth-DKG is able to steer most of this
computational burden off-chain by taking an optimistic approach:
It proceeds assuming that all players follow the protocol and allows
accounts to file disputes in case they detect a problem. In the latter
case, dispute arbitration happens by an interactive protocol between
the disputing players. The arbitration protocol has both on-chain
and off-chain components. This way, Eth-DKG can accommodate
a few hundreds of participants without exceeding the Ethereum
block gas limit [61, 70]. We set nmax = 256 in Gˆ.
7.3 Addressing Real-World Issues
7.3.1 Registration. The registration phase needs to make sure that
no more than nmax accounts register. But restricting n risks the
decentralization of the EVR source as a single entity that registers
multiple times might prevent others from registering. Our heuristic
to address this issue is to leave the registration phase open for a
predefined time (we set it to 24 hours, but this is configurable), and
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let users bid how much deposit they are willing to invest. By the
end of the registration period, the top nmax bidders are chosen to
participate. The risk with this method is that at the very end of the
registration phase an attacker can submit multiple bids, slightly
outbidding the current ones, without time for others to respond.
To mitigate this problem, we limit the number of accepted bids per
block to 1 and only accept bids that outbid the current lowest bid
by at least 3% (again, these parameters are configurable).
While in G the registration ends when the application calls
comTrigger, which it can do whenever it pleases, in Gˆ we set a
few constraints on the transition from the registration to the commit
phases. As mentioned, we set a minimum time for the registration
phase – 24 hours. Also, we set nmin = 100 such that as long as
nmin accounts do not register, registration cannot end. Finally, if
comTrigger is not called within a predetermined time frame, the
registered accounts can withdraw their deposits. Another slight
variation between G and Gˆ is that in our implementation, we allow
multiple registrations from the same account in a single transaction
in order to reduce gas costs.
7.3.2 Informing. The informing mechanism we propose in Sec-
tion 4 is susceptible to front-running – an attacker listening to the
network may detect an informing transaction, learn the secret, sub-
mit a competing informing transaction with a higher gas bid, and
front-run the original transaction to collect the informing reward.
This risk nullifies the informant’s original incentive to inform and
breaks our EVR source’s incentive layer.
To address this problem we employ a two phase commit-reveal
informing mechanism. In the first phase, the informant submits a
commit-informing transaction that includes a hash of the secret
x and the account that is meant to receive the informing reward
– hash(x | |acc). In the second phase, the informant reveals both x
and acc in a reveal-informing transaction.
From the commit-informing transaction, an attacker that owns
an EOA accA cannot infer a corresponding hash, hash(x | |accA),
and cannot front-run the original informant. The only way for an
attacker to compute hash(x | |accA) is by obtaining x . If the attacker
learns x only from the reveal transaction, then she needs to cause
a reorg back to the block before the original informant’s commit-
informing transaction was included. By requiring a long enough
delay between the commit-informing and the reveal-informing
transactions, such a reorg is not a viable risk (we configure this
delay to be 30 blocks).
To disincentivize false commit-informing transactions (where the
presumed informant does not know x and submits a garbage hash),
Gˆ processes such transactions only if they come with a deposit.
The deposit is paid back when a corresponding reveal-informing
transaction is processed.
7.3.3 Reconstructing x : on-chain vs off-chain. In our EVR source,
in the reveal phase, players engage in a run of DKGreveal that
reconstructs x (or a signature in the multi-shot variant) off-chain
and then publishes it on-chain for G to verify. We could have taken
a different approach, where players publish their individual shares
on G, which then calculates x on-chain (once t + 1 shares are pub-
lished). This approach could eliminate the collective punishment
enforced when robustness breaks, as G can now confiscate only the
deposits tied to shares that were not revealed on time. However, this
approach does not scale in the number of shares, and we therefore
opt for off-chain reconstruction both in our theoretical solution
and in our implementation.
7.3.4 Transaction fees. Transaction fees in Ethereum are not pre-
dictable and vary dramatically between periods of high and low
demand [30].
When transaction fees are significant, the off-chain reconstruc-
tion introduces asymmetry among the players: a single player sub-
mits a reveal transaction and has to pay the fee, whereas other
players do not pay anything. The risk is that in order to avoid this
extra payment, players would leave it to other players to submit the
reveal transaction, ending up in a situation where no one actually
submits it.
Tomitigate this risk, we add to Gˆ a built-in fee refundmechanism
(only for reveal transactions). The refund is paid to the player who
submits the transaction, with Gˆ’s coins. In this way, the fee is
divided equally among all players: instead of returning the full 1
coin deposit (per registered account), Gˆ returns 1 − feen .
Nevertheless, a naÃŕve refund mechanism that simply reim-
burses the full amount is susceptible to an attack where the player
submitting the transaction bids for an unnecessarily high gas price.
This attack benefits the miner who mines the transaction, and this
miner might collude with the bidder. To mitigate this risk, Gˆ’s
reveal phase stays open for some short time (5 blocks) after the
first reveal transaction is processed. During this time, players may
submit additional reveal transactions paying lower fees. Only the
player who pays the lowest fee is refunded. Thus, if players detect
a reveal transaction that substantially exceeds the current fee level,
they submit a cheaper reveal transaction, to make sure that they
are not paying too much to miners.
Orthogonal to this technique, to reduce fees that players need
to pay, we use a GasToken-based approach. GasToken [16] allows
users to (conceptually) purchase gas, store it, and later on consume
it to cover transaction fees when gas prices are high. Our contract
preemptively purchases gas tokens if it is cheap and automatically
(without user intervention) uses them when gas prices are high
(gas prices are considered high when they pass some threshold,
measured according to historical data) for reveal transactions.
8 RELATEDWORK
While distributed randomness generation has been widely studied
for decades, our work is unique in considering the randomness
generation problem in an economic context and providing a solution
that motivates cooperation under a strong game-theoretic concept.
We now discuss related approaches to randomness generation.
Traditional distributed coin flipping. Traditionally, coin flipping
protocols [7, 13, 25, 49] are designed for an adversarial model where
some threshold of the participating processes are Byzantine and
the remaining ones follow the protocol. From such protocols, we
adopt the approach of committing to randomly sampled secrets
before revealing them; in particular, our multi-shot EVR source uses
VRFs [47], as previously done in [22, 26, 41, 42, 46, 63, 68]. Note that
protocols designed for adversarial models are not applicable as-is
to economic settings due to economic pressures that might lead
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more than the predefined threshold of the participants to diverge
from the protocol. Our solution mitigates this problem using secret-
sharing and incentives, as well as bounding the economic worth of
the secret. We prove that within our economic context, such attacks
are not profitable and thus are not exercised by our game-theoretic
players.
Blockchain-based randomness. Similarly to our EVR source, a
number of recent works have used public blockchains for dis-
tributed randomness generation, where the blockchain provides
the source of truth regarding the generated random values.
Some of these works consider a fully-adversarial setting, where
any number of players may be malicious [1, 11, 48]. Although these
solutions are more robust than ours (as they consider a broader
range of user behaviors), this comes at a cost: In Bitcoin-based
lotteries [1, 11], deposits are very high – O(n2) where the jackpot
and the number of participants are both O(n). In contrast, our
deposits are 1 coin for a jackpot of O(n) with n participants. And
while in Zero-Collateral Lotteries [48] there are no deposits, they
have limited scalability, as they require players to actively interact
on-chain in O(logn) rounds. The economic setting in which our
solution is realized enable us to reduce both the on-chain load
and the deposits, while maintaining the trustworthiness of the
randomness produced. Moreover, in the aforementioned works, the
randomness generation is tied to a particular lottery application,
whereas our solution provides randomness as-a-service, to arbitrary
applications.
Similarly to our EVR source, RANDAO [56, 57] is a smart con-
tract on Ethereum that is used as an escrow to incentivize correct
execution of a commit-reveal scheme. Yet RANDAO has not mod-
eled user behavior or considered the economic implications of the
randomness it produces. If it were to be used for a lottery in a
model similar to ours, it would require deposits of O(n2) similarly
to [1, 11], because its incentive structure is similar to theirs.
The blockchain itself (e.g., Nakamoto consensus [50] or Algo-
rand [36, 46]) typically generates and uses randomness for the
specific purpose of selecting a leader to append new blocks to the
chain. Like our protocol, blockchains require decentralization in
order to work correctly [31, 51, 59]. Yet unlike blockchains, our
protocol preserves decentralization if it exists in the initial state –
the informing mechanism acts as an effective counter-measure to
centralization pressure.
Some recent works have exploited Bitcoin’s proofs-of-work to
extract publicly-verifiable random bits [10, 15] that are safe to use
by general lotteries. Like our work, (and in contrast to most other
works in the area), they consider selfish agents that attempt to
distort the randomness generation process for a profit. Specifically,
they show under which conditions it is profitable for a lottery
player to attack. However, a user partaking in the lottery has no
way of knowing whether other players can attack profitably, and so
cannot tell whether the random generation process is indeed fair. In
contrast, our solution ensures the fairness of the process whenever
the application follows the correct usage guidelines. The EVR source
explicitly and publicly specifies the bound on the randomness’
worth, and any user can verify (using the public blockchain) that
the application respects these bounds.
Related cryptographic primitives. A game-theoretic model was
also considered in the context of Rational Secret Sharing (RSS) [5, 33,
39, 40, 43], which focuses on reconstructing a secret (not necessarily
a random value) among a network of selfish agents who prefer
to learn the secret alone rather than together. In contrast, in our
setting, the main profit is made when x is publicly published, and
so learning it alone (after cnd matures) has little benefit.
Delayed computation techniques [45] utilize inherently sequen-
tial computations in order to generate random bits. A promising
research direction in this vein is verifiable delay functions (VDFs) [14,
55, 66], which are exponentially faster to verify than to evaluate, and
hence, their input can be used as a commitment to a random value
that will take time to be discovered. However, as of today, VDFs are
not readily usable without some trusted setup. Furthermore, delays
vary dramatically across hardware technologies, implying that the
random value is revealed much earlier to some users than to others,
making it difficult to incentivize slower users to partake in the eval-
uation process. Whereas VDFs are not practical today, simple delay
functions (without fast verifiability) have been implemented using
smart contracts [17]. But their verification occurs via an elaborate
dispute process that consumes significant on-chain resources, and
can take place for every new random value. In contrast, in our
multi-shot EVR source, such a dispute process might take place at
most once – during the commit phase. Subsequently, verification of
new random values occurs exclusively on-chain. Moreover, in the
delayed computation approach there is an inherent delay before
every new random value is publicized, whereas our EVR source
can produce random bits on-demand within a latency proportional
to the blockchain’s block generation rate.
9 CONCLUSION
Blockchain-based dApps are proliferating nowadays, offering a
wide range of decentralized trusted services. A lucrative application
domain in this context is online gambling. Nevertheless, dApps im-
plemented as smart contracts are inherently deterministic and thus
cannot natively support such dApps. Rather, they need a trusted
external source of randomness. In this work, we have addressed
this need for a randomness source that can sustain its trustworthi-
ness even when the provided randomness has significant economic
consequences. To this end, we introduced the notion of EVR and
showed how to build an EVR source.
Our EVR source produces random bits via an open distributed
protocol where players are rational and may collude using side-
contracts on the blockchain. Our protocol incorporates a novel
informing mechanism, which acts as an effective deterrent against
collusion, guaranteeing that the secret bits indeed remain secret.
Our game-theoretic analysis has shown that as long as none of
the players is “too rich”, following the default strategy gives rise to
a Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium – a powerful solution concept
in game theory – where secrecy and robustness hold.
We implemented a proof-of-concept of our EVR source as a
smart contract over the Ethereum public blockchain, optimizing off-
chain communication to achieve scalability to hundreds of players.
We hope that future work will suggest – and build – additional
realizations of the EVR source formalized herein. In particular, it
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would be interesting to push scalability even further, perhaps by
improving the off-chain execution path.
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A FORMAL PROOFS
Lemma 5.2 (restated). For allC ⊆ [N ] and for all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si , such
that (i) SEC(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, there exists a player
i ∈ C such that ui (s∗) ≥ ui (sC , s∗−C ).
Proof. Consider a coalition C that deviates from s∗ resulting in
a strategy vector s ≜ (sC , s∗−C ) as assumed.
Consider the case of ROB(s), then by A2 ∀i ∈ [N ] : zi (s) = 0, so
ui (s) = yi (s) + wi (s). Note that ∑Ni=1(yi + wi − ai ) ≤ 0, because∑N
i=1 yi ≤ 0 from E2,
∑N
i=1wi ≤ n from D1 and
∑N
i=1 ai = n from
definition. If for all i ∈ [N ] : yi + wi − ai = 0, then ui (s) = ai
thereby, none of the payoffs change relative to s∗. Otherwise, there
is some i ∈ [N ] such that yi +wi − ai , 0. Hence, there is at least
one player j where yj +w j − aj < 0, therefore, uj (s) < uj (s∗) = aj .
If j < C , then j does not engage in side contracts. This implies that
uj (s) ≥ aj (by E3 and D4), which is a contradiction. Thus, j ∈ C as
required for this case.
We move to consider the case of ¬ROB(s), which implies that
∥C ∥ ≥ n − t and, by D3, ∀i ∈ [N ] : ui (s) = zi (s) + yi (s). Consider
the set of players Q who are not better off after C’s deviation,
Q ≜ {i ∈ [N ] : ui (s) ≤ ui (s∗)}.
We show that ∥Q ∥ ≥ t + 1. Assume by way of contradiction that
∥Q ∥ < t + 1. Denote Q = [N ] \Q and note the following:
(1) For all i ∈ Q , zi + yi − ai > 0. This stems directly from the
definition of Q and the payoffs in s and s∗.
(2)
∑
i ∈Q (zi +yi ) ≤
∑
i ∈[N ](zi +yi ) < P . Here, the first inequal-
ity is due to s ∈ S+, and the second is by A1 and E2.
(3)
Q ≥ n − t = P , by the contradiction assumption.
Hence,
0 <
∑
i ∈Q
(zi + yi − ai ) =
∑
i ∈Q
(zi + yi ) −
Q < P − P = 0,
a contradiction. We conclude that Q ∩C , ∅ which implies that at
least one member in C is not better off after the deviation. □
Note that in this proof we have not used the restriction that
players have a limited budget of external coins.
Lemma 5.3 (restated). For all C ⊆ [N ] and for all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si ,
such that (i) INF(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, there exists a player
i ∈ C such that ui (s∗) ≥ ui (sC , s∗−C ).
Proof. Consider a coalition C that deviates from s∗ resulting in
a strategy vector s ≜ (sC , s∗−C ) as assumed. Denote the informant
by f ∈ [N ]. Denote Cˆ ≜ C ∪ { f } and observe that Cˆ ≥ t + 1.
(f does not necessarily belong to C as players who follow the
default strategy inform in stage 2 if they can.) INF(s) implies that
∀i , f : ui (s) = zi (s) + yi (s) by D2.
Consider the set of players who are not better off afterC’s devia-
tion, Q ≜ {i ∈ [N ] : ui (s) ≤ ui (s∗)}. Note that f < Q as she makes
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a net profit from the deviation: uf (s) = ℓ + zf (s) + yf (s) ≥ ℓ − ef
and uf (s∗) = af . From Equation (1) we have ef + af ≤ n/3 < n = ℓ.
We show that ∥Q ∥ ≥ n − t . Assume by way of contradiction that
∥Q ∥ < n − t . Denote Q = [N ] \ (Q ∪ { f }) and note the following:
(1) For all i ∈ Q , zi + yi − ai > 0. This stems directly from the
definition of Q .
(2)
∑
i ∈Q (zi + yi ) ≤
∑
i ∈[N ]\{f }(zi + yi ) < ef + P . Here, the
first inequality is due to the fact that s ∈ S+, and the second
inequality is due to A1, E2 and the fact that yf ≥ −ef (E1).
(3)
Q = (n − (af + ∥Q ∥) > n − af − (n − t) = t − af . The
inequality here is due to the contradiction assumption.
Hence,
0 <
∑
i ∈Q
(zi + yi − ai ) =
∑
i ∈Q
(zi + yi ) −
Q
< (ef + P) − (t − af ) ≤ (2t − n) + (n − t) − t = 0,
a contradiction. In the last inequality we used Equation (1), which
implies that ef + af ≤ n/3 = 2t − n. We conclude that Q ∩ Cˆ , ∅,
and since f < Q , we conclude that at least one member in C is not
better off after the deviation. □
Lemma 5.4 (restated). For all C ⊆ [N ] and all sC ∈ ∏i ∈C Si , such
that (i) ¬SEC(sC , s∗−C ) and (ii) (sC , s∗−C ) ∈ S+, either (sC , s∗−C ) is
not self-enforcing, or there exists a player i ∈ C such that ui (s∗) ≥
ui (sC , s∗−C ).
Proof. Consider a coalition C that deviates from s∗ resulting in
a strategy vector s ≜ (sC , s∗−C ) as assumed.
If INF(s), then from Lemma 5.3 there is (at least) one member of
C who is not better off after the deviation, and we are done.
Otherwise,¬INF(s). Denote by f the player that owns an account
with the lowest id among those who obtain ≥ t + 1 shares after
stage 1 (since secrecy breaks in s there is at least one such player).
Recall that in our model, f ’s informing transaction (if issued) would
precede all other informing transactions (if any). f ∈ C as she does
not inform, although the default strategy instructs her to do so. We
next argue that there is a member of C that is better off deviating
again, rendering s not self-enforcing. Consider three cases.
(1) Assume uf (s) ≤ af + P . By Equation (1), ef + af ≤ n/3 <
2n
3 = ℓ−P which implies ℓ−ef > af +P . ℓ−ef is f ’s minimal
payoff if she unilaterally deviates from s and informs, and
it is higher than f ’s payoff under s . So, in this case, s is not
self-enforcing.
(2) Assume uf (s) > af + P and ROB(s). Since
∑N
i=1 ui (s) < P +∑N
i=1 ai (by P1), the assumption implies that some player
j ∈ [N ] ends up with uj (s) < aj . Note that if j now deviates
from s and plays the default strategy (and therefore does not
engage in side contracts), robustness continues to hold and
she gains at least aj (by E3 and D4). So in this case, too, s is
not self-enforcing.
(3) Assume uf (s) > af + P and ¬ROB(s). Now, for all i ∈ [N ] :
ui (s) = zi (s) +yi (s) by D3. So, by E2 and A1 ∑Ni=1 ui (s) < P ,
which implies that some player j ∈ [N ] ends up with uj (s) <
0. So, s < S+ in contradiction to our assumption. □
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